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1. Introduction
The phenomenon of the so-called ”bi-sourcing”, i.e., a final-good producer ac-
quires the same set of inputs both by purchasing from external suppliers (out-
sourcing) and carrying out in-house production (insourcing), widely exists. For
example, according to Johnson (2007), Mattel made most of its own die-casting
molds at a facility in Malaysia, but also outsourced them to firms in Hong Kong.
Carey and Frangos (2005) also reports that U.S. airlines’ heavy-over haul work is
conducted half-to-half by in-house mechanics and outside vendors in the U.S.
and overseas from less than a third in 1990. Various theories have been devel-
oped to explain this phenomenon. In the point of view in Du et al. (2006, 2009),
a firm adopts strategic bi-sourcing because they want to apply the cross-threat
effect between the internal and external suppliers, as well as the possible cost
advantage brought forward by outsourcing. This idea is followed by Stenbac-
ka and Tombak (2010), which adopts the same analytic framework except that
the bargaining power of the external supplier increases with the amount of the
intermediate outsourced to it. Not directly relevant but closely associated with
bi-sourcing, Spencer and Raubitschek (1996) finds that joint venture will adopt
in-house production of intermediate inputs with higher marginal cost and also
import them from their abroad rivals, because competition in the market of in-
termediate input will reduce the price of importing intermediate inputs. Beladi
andMukherjee (2008) proposes another theoretic explanation for the occurrence
of bi-sourcing. In their analysis, a firm is faced with a deterministic demand. It
can produce a good himself at a constant cost c, or acquire it from an external
supplier at a cost w. The firm must determine its product capacity before it ob-
serves the cost w, after which the supplier determines w, then it decides whether
to outsource or not. They show that bi-sourcing occurs in this framework. The
problem in this framework is that it’s not plausible that firms can not observe w
before they makes their outsourcing decision. Moreover, their analysis is limited
in a closed economy, and characteristics of firms is ignored.
This paper tries to propose anewandmore plausible explanation for bi-sourcing
in a general equilibrium of international trade. We investigate the relationship a-
mong a final-good producer’s organizational choices, its productivity level and
the uncertainty of its demand in a two-country (the North and the South), two-
factor (labor and capital), n + 1 -industry (with one homogeneous industry and
another n differentiated industries) general equilibrium framework with monop-
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olistic competition, increasing returns to scale, and free trade. In our model, a
representative firm in a representative, monopolistically competitive, and differ-
entiated industry must pay a fixed cost fE to enter into the market before it starts
to produce its differentiated final good, whose production requires two interme-
diated inputs, h and m, where h can only be produced in the North by the final-
good producer itself, while m can be produced in both countries. After paying
the fixed entry cost, the final-good producer gets aware of its productivity lev-
el, which is randomly drawn from a known cumulative distribution. Knowing its
productivity level, it is faced with investment decisions, which are dividend into
two stages. In the first stage, it shall determine the production capacity of h (i.e.,
invest how many capitals and labors to produce h), which can not be expanded
afterward. In the second stage, the final-good producer observes the demand of
its variety and decides whether to integrate or outsource the production ofm and
whether to do it domestically or abroad. A representative final-good producer has
totally five potential organizational choices, integrating the production of m in-
house, outsourcing it to a supplier in the North or in the South, integrating and
outsourcing it in the North simultaneously, and integrating it in the North and
outsourcing it in the South simultaneously. Both Integration and outsourcing (no
matter in the North or in the South) incur fixed organizational costs. The final-
good producer has to pay a sum of the organizational costs if it adopts integration
and outsourcing simultaneously. After it decides to outsource the production of
m partially or completely, the producer and (if partial outsourcing occurs) / or (if
complete outsourcing occurs) its supplier invest capitals and labors to produce
m. Then bargaining on division of the surplus of the final sale between the two
parties occurs before its realization. As the production capacity of hmust be de-
termined prior to the outsourcing decisions ofm and it can not be expanded, the
contract between the two parties is incomplete and the intermediate input m is
specific to its final good, under-investment problem may occur. Knowing this,
the final-good producer has two ways to mitigate it–adjusting the production ca-
pacity ex ante or integrating a part of the production ofm.
The main contributions of this article are multi-fold. First, it incorporates de-
mand uncertainty, capacity constraints, and firms’ organizational choices into
a general equilibrium framework with incomplete contracts and firms’ heteroge-
neous productivity to investigate how the uncertainty of firms’ demands and their
productivity heterogeneity affect their making-or-buying organizational choices.
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This setting is new according to the authors’ knowledge. Second, the paper shows
that a final-good producer may adopt integrating a part of the production of it-
s intermediate input in-house and outsource it at arm’s length domestically or
abroad simultaneously, which does not occur in many other literatures on multi-
nationals’ organization and trade. This paper also shows that the increase of a
firm’s productivity level results in successively exiting the market, outsourcing in
the North, outsourcing in the South, integrating and outsourcing in the North
simultaneously, and integrating in the North and outsourcing in the South simul-
taneously. Third, the paper shows that the increase of the uncertainty of a firm’s
demandhas the same effects on its organizational choices as that of its productiv-
ity. The paper further investigates the influences of uncertainty and productivity
on the prevalence of a firm’s various organizational modes.
Except for those literatures cited above for explanations of bi-sourcing, the
framework proposed in this paper also connects to those literatures on multina-
tionals’ organization under the general equilibrium framework of international
trade, which include Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004, 2006) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2007),1Grossman andHelpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005),2 andGross-
man et al. (2003, 2005).3 For detailed overviews of these work, we refer readers to
Antras (2005), Helpman (2006) and Antras and Esteban (2008). Our paper more
closely connects to Antras (2003), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Antras and Helpman
(2004, 2006), in which they apply the same GHM framework and the Melitz mod-
el to investigate firms’ organizational choices. Similar to them, this paper also
investigate how firms’ productivity level influences their organizational choices,
but it is set under the uncertainty environment, in which firms’ demand is un-
known before they make their organizational choices. Under uncertainty, Firm-
s’ production capacities and their un-expandability are introduced. Firms must
first determine their production capacities of one intermediate input, which are
not expandable afterward, and then observe their demand uncertainty before
making organizational choices. That firms must determine the production ca-
pacities of one input before the realization of their demand uncertainty incurs
1which apply the productivity heterogeneity model proposed in Melitz (2003) and the
Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) framework proposed in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
John (1990); Hart and Moore (1999), to investigate how multinationals organize their global pro-
duction in ownerships and locations
2which use transaction costs method to study multinationals’ integration and outsourcing s-
trategies
3which investigates howmultinationals determines their optimal organizational strategies.
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possible risks of loss, while that they make their organizational decisions (in-
tegrating or outsourcing) after the demand uncertainty is realized makes them
possible to diversify risks of loss to suppliers and supple investment if demand
realized ex post is larger than expected ex ante. Hence there exists a tradeoff a-
mong ex ante production capacities of one input, ex post investment of another
input, demand uncertainty, and firms’ productivity level. This setting thus re-
sults in more complicated but rich results. Moreover, the organizational choices
investigated in this paper are somewhat different from those explored in Antras
(2003), Acemoglu et al. (2007), Antras and Helpman (2004, 2006). We investigates
the cases that firms adopt simultaneously integration and outsourcing, but donot
investigate firms’ FDI. As a result, the relationship between firms’ organizational
modes and their productivity level are different.
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces
the model structure. Section 3 devotes to analyze the model, including both a-
mong a final-good producer’s optimal organizational choice, its productivity lev-
el, and the uncertainty of its demand. Section 4 investigates how demand un-
certainty affects the prevalence of various organizational modes, as well as firms’
productivity. Section 5 outlines how a general equilibrium and thus the equilibri-
um prevalence of various organizational modes can be determined. Conclusions
are drawn in section 6, with future extensions included.
2. Themodel
In the world we consider are there two countries, the North and the South, de-
noted respectively by N and S, and two factors, the labor and the capital, de-
noted respectively by L and K. Suppose that the labor and the capital in coun-
try l ∈ {N, S} are Ll and K l, respectively. There are two sectors (industries) in
both country, one producing homogeneous numeraire goods, whose price is then
p0 = 1, and the others producing differentiated final goods, which are indexed by
1, 2, · · · , n and whose prices are respectively p1, · · · , pn. We suppose that all con-
sumers in the two countries have the same preferences, whose corresponding
utility function is of the CES form, i.e.,
U = ν ln y0 +
1− ν
ρ
ln
(
n∑
i=1
xρi
)
, 0 < ν, ρ < 1, (1)
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where x0 is the consumption of a homogeneous good, and xi is the consumption
of the ith differentiated good, where the number of the differentiated goods is en-
dogenously determined. From a representative consumer’s utility maximization
problem, one can find the demand function of each good as follows:
pi = zy
ρ−1
i . (2)
In this paper, we assume that z is uncertain because of the random change of the
income of the economy or the random change of consumers’ preference. More
specifically, we assume that z follows a uniform distribution on [z¯ − σ
2
, z¯ + σ
2
],
where 0 < σ < 2z¯. We make this assumption because demand must be positive,
and we want to keep a symmetric uncertainty so that we can analyze the effect
of demand uncertainty on firms’ organizational choices. We will show that it’s a
crux for firms to partially outsource the production of differentiated goods.
The production of the homogenous good requires both capitals and labors,
whose production functions are identical in both countries and are supposed to
be y0 = L
αK1−α, α ∈ (0, 1). Suppose the production technology of the homoge-
nous good is of constant returns to scale, whose market competition is perfect,
while that of each differentiated final good is monopolistic, so that each differ-
entiated good is produced by only one producer, which we call a final-good pro-
ducer. Each producer’s output is small enough relative to the total outputs of the
market so that the price change of any differentiated good does not affect prices
of other differentiated goods. Suppose differentiated good i’s production requires
two inputs, a headquarter service hi and an intermediate component mi, where
mi can only be supplied by operators of manufacturing plants, which are called
intermediate-component or intermediate-input suppliers in this paper.
The production of the headquarter service hi and that of the intermediate
component mi for differentiated good i require both capitals and labors, whose
production functions are supposed to be hi = L
γK1−γ andmi = L
βK1−β, respec-
tively. We suppose that the production functions of headquarter services and in-
termediate components are identical respectively for all differentiated-good pro-
ducers. We assume that α > β > γ, so that the headquarter service is the most
capital-intensive while the homogeneous good is the most labor-intensive. Let
wN and wS be the wage rates and rN and rS be the interest rates in the North and
the South, respectively.
Now, different from the usual assumption of production, we assume that the
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production of both homogeneous good and that of the intermediate components
are instantaneous, i.e., producers of these goods invest capitals andhire labors in-
stantaneously and then produce the goods, while that of the headquarter services
is divided into two stages. In the first stage, a final-goodproducermust determine
its production capacity, i.e., it must determine how many capitals to invest and
how many labors to hire before its production. The principle to determine its
production capacity includes cost minimization and expected profit maximiza-
tion, i.e., the final-good producer shall choose appropriate capitals and labors to
minimize its production cost, given its production capacity, while the capacity is
determined according to expected profit maximization, with demand unknown
when the production capacity is determined.
As we set a symmetric model for the economy, the sequel proceeds for a rep-
resentative final producer. A final-good producer does not know its productivity
level before it pays an indispensable fixed cost FE to enter the differentiated-good
market. This cost FE is identical for all potential entrants. After that, the producer
draws a productivity level θ from a random distributionG(θ), which is a common
knowledge for all potential entrants. We suppose that the production function of
each differentiated good is y = θ
(
h
η
)η (
m
1−η
)1−η
with 0 < η < 1, where h andm are
the quantities of headquarter service and intermediate component required to
produce y quantity of the representative producer’s differentiated good. Herein
we assume that each final-good producer owns the same production technology.
After observing its productivity level, the final-good producer decideswhether
to exit the market or not, in the latter case it will observe its demand uncertainty
z, and then it engages in production. In doing so, an additional fixed cost of orga-
nizing production is incurred, which is a function of the structure of ownership
and the location of production. If the producer selects to start production, it has
two choices, integrating the production of its headquarter service and intermedi-
ate component or outsourcing the latter completely or partially domestically or
abroad. That is, the producer is faced with two kinds of decisions, ownership de-
cision and location choice. In the former, it must determine whether to integrate
or outsource the production of its intermediate components, and in the latter,
it must determine where to do them. In this paper, integration and outsourcing
do not just mean to keep the production of an intermediate input in-house or at
arm’s length completely, but imply partially or completely. For example, the final-
good producermay keep the production of an intermediate inputm in-house and
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outsource its production at arm’s length partially simultaneously. In this case, we
call the producer integrate and outsource the production of the input simultane-
ously. We denote the integration and outsourcing in the ownership choices by V
and O, and denote the North and the South in the location choices by N and S,
respectively. We don’t want to investigate foreign integration ( usually called FDI
) in this paper. Moreover, we do not consider the case that a final-good producer
outsource the production of the same intermediate input m to suppliers in both
countries at the same time, but require that the producer only outsources it to a
supplier in one country, if it is willing to do so. Extensions can be made to cov-
er these cases in future work. Thus, the final-good producer faces five potential
choices, integrating in the North ( denoted by (V,N) ), outsourcing in the North
( denoted by (O,N)), outsourcing in the South ( denoted by (O, S) ), ( partially)
integrating and outsourcing its intermediate component m in the North (denot-
ed by (V O,NN) ), (partially) integrating in the North and partially outsourcing its
component in the South (denoted by by (V O,NS)), respectively. We call (V,N),
(O,N), (O, S), (V O,NN) and (V O,NS) the potential organizational modes for a
representative final-good producer.
For choice of each organizationalmode (k, l) ∈ {(V,N), (O,N), (O, S), (V O,NN),
(V O,NS)}, a representative final-good producer must pay a fixed organization-
al cost f lk, with (k, l) = (V,N), or (k, l) = (O, l), l ∈ {N, S}. We suppose that
fNV > f
S
O > f
N
O to avoid a complex potential taxonomy of organizational choic-
es. This ranking implies that the organizational costs of any firm integrating the
production of m in the North is larger than those outsourcing it in each country,
respectively. For its partial integration or outsourcing choice, it has to pay a sum
of fixed costs of two corresponding independent organizational modes. For ex-
ample, if the producer partially integrate in the North, then it has to pay a fixed
cost of fNV + f
N
O as it is engaged into two different relationships with two different
kinds of suppliers.
Free entry into each sector ensures zero expected profits for a potential en-
trant. To simplify the description of the industry equilibrium, we assume that
upon entry the supplier makes a lump-sum transfer Tk(i) to the final-good pro-
ducer, which can vary by industry k and variety i. Ex-ante, there is a large number
of identical, potential suppliers for each variety in each industry, so that compe-
tition among these suppliers will make Tk(i) adjust to zero so as to make them
break even.
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We apply the Grossman-Hart-Moore framework (first proposed in Grossman
and Hart (1986), and later developed in Hart and John (1990); Hart and Moore
(1999) to analyze the incomplete contracts signed ex-ante between final-good
producers and their suppliers. According to this framework, the contracts signed
between the two parties can not specify the purchase of specialized intermedi-
ate components for a certain price, the amount of capital and labor hired or the
volume of sales revenues obtained after the final good is sold. That is, that the
parties can not commit not to renegotiate an initial contract and that the pre-
cise nature of the required input is revealed only ex-post, and it’s not verifiable
by a third party. To divide the ex-post revenue from the final sale, the two parties
have to bargain over the surplus from the relationship after the inputs have been
produced. In this paper, we assume that it’s a generalized Nash bargaining game
between the two parties. Suppose a representative final-good producer obtains
a fraction ζ ∈ [0, 1] of the ex-post gains from the relationship, where the param-
eter ζ measures the bargaining power of the final-good producer. Here ζ may be
distinct for each producer as the producers are heterogenous in productivity.
Suppose that ex-post bargaining between a representative producer and its
supplier takes place only under outsourcing. In integration, the producer orga-
nizes the total production processes itself and thus seizes the total surplus of the
production. This assumption deviates a little from those of the classical papers,
such as Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1999) and many successive
applications of GHM framework in analysis of global organizational choices of
multinationals, such as Antras andHelpman (2004, 2006), Acemoglu et al. (2007),
etc. For outsourcing, we assume that the final-good producer obtains what it can
get by using h andm it produces to produce its final good and selling it, while its
supplier gets zero, if the contract between it and its supplier breaches. 4
4 This assumption is also different from Antras and Helpman (2004, 2006), Acemoglu et al.
(2007), etc. In fact, the distribution of surplus is related to the organizational modes. Specifically,
if the producer does not own a manufacturing plant (i.e., complete outsourcing), then when the
contract between the the producer and its supplier breaches, both sides obtain no income as
the components are tailored specifically to the opposite party in the relationship; if the producer
totally owns a manufacturing plant as its supplier does (i.e., outsourcing partially in the North
or the South), then when the contract breaks down, the producer can fire the supplier, get the
component mi with a loss of a fraction of 1 − δl fraction of final-good production for l ∈ {N,S},
as the producer can ask its integrated workers producing intermediate components tomodify the
supplier’s components to fit its own demand. We can assume that δN ≥ δS , which implies that
a contractual breach is more likely costly to the producer when the supplier is in the South than
in the North, as the North have a better institutional environment. Our model can be extended
to this setting without any difficulty, by noticing that ζl = δ
ρ
l + ζ(1 − δ
ρ
l ), l = N,S for this setting,
where ζl is the bargaining power of the final-good producer toward its supplier in country l. See
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After the final-good producer makes its decisions on organizational modes
when the demand uncertainty realizes, it and its supplies decide how muchm to
produce. If a final-good producer decides to integrate the production ofm in the
North, itmust determine howmuchm to produce. If the producer decides to out-
source, then it must choose the bargaining power with its supplier, how muchm
to produce, while its suppliers decides how muchm to produce. When the final-
good producer or both parties makes or make their decisions on how much m
to produce, they choose the optimal capitals and labors to minimize the produc-
tion cost of producing m. Finally, when the final-good producer or both parties
have produced h and m, the final-good producer combines them to produce its
final good and then sell it in the market, with the final sale and thus the surplus
realized. Both parties divide the surplus according the contract signed ex ante.
3. Organizational decisions after the uncertainty is
realized
In this section, we consider the case that a representative final-good producer
makes its organizational decisions after the uncertain demand is realized. Ac-
cording to the modeling in section 2, the timing of the game is as follows.
Time 0 A representative final-good producer (F in short) decides whether to payFE
to enter the market, and it knows its productivity θ afterward, which follows
a Pareto distribution.
Time 1 Knowing its productivity θ and staying in the market, F decides its produc-
tion capacity H of h. After that, it obverves z. Its production capacity can
not be expanded thereafter.
Time 2 F decideswhether to integrate or outsource the production ofm. IfF adopt-
s only integration, it needs to pay fNV . If F adopts only outsourcing in coun-
try l, it needs to pay f lO, where l ∈ {N, S}. If F adopts integration and out-
sourcing simultaneously, it has to pay f lO + f
N
V .
Time 3 Both the final-goodproducer and its intermediate-input supplier (S in short)
decide how much m to produce. Suppose their outputs are m and mlO, re-
spectively, where l ∈ {N, S} is the country the supplier is in.
Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004, 2006).
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Time 4 After that, both parties bargain on division of the surplus.
Time 5 The sale of the final product and thus the total surplus is realized.
We solve the above problem by back induction. First, at Time 5 , the total sale
income is zθρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m+ml
O
1−η
)ρ(1−η)
. Knowing this, both the final-good producer
and its intermediate-input supplier bargain on it at Time 4 . We assume that the
bargaining is of the form of Nash Bargaining. As the intermediate inputm is total-
ly specialized, it’s out of use for the supplier S if it fails to agree with F , and hence
its reserved payoff is 0. While for F , it can perform the production of its final
good with its ownm even without the intermediate inputmlO from S, and hence
its reserved payoff is zθρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m
1−η
)ρ(1−η)
. Suppose the bargaining power of F is
ζ . In this paper, we only consider the case that a final-good producer outsources
the production ofm in only one country if it does. Then there are three cases for
the payoffs of both parties under given uncertainty z at Time 4 . If F only adopts
integration of the production ofm, then its payoff is
πNV = zθ
ρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m
1− η
)ρ(1−η)
− fNmm− f
N
V . (3)
If F only adopts outsourcing of the production of m in country l ∈ {N, S}, then
its payoff is
πlO = ζzθ
ρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
mlO
1− η
)ρ(1−η)
− f lO + T
l
O. (4)
If F adopts integration in countryN and outsourcing in country l simultaneously,
then its payoff is
πlV O = ζzθ
ρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m+mlO
1− η
)ρ(1−η)
+ (1− ζ)zθρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m
1− η
)ρ(1−η)
(5)
−fNmm− f
l
O − f
N
V + T
l
O.
In the above expressions, f lm =
(
wl
β
)β (
rl
1−β
)1−βl
is theminimal cost producing one
unit ofm in country l ∈ {N, S}, and wl and rl are the prices of labor and capital in
country l, respectively.
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On the other side, if outsourcing occurs, the payoff of the supplier in country
l is
πlS = (1− ζ)zθ
ρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m+mlO
1− η
)ρ(1−η)
− f lmmO − T
l
O. (6)
In the above expressions, T lO is the lump-sum transfer made by S to the final-
good producer. As there is a large number of identical potential suppliers for each
variety in each industry, ex-ante, the competition among these suppliers adjust
the lump-sum transfer T to zero so as tomake them break even. This implies that
F can seize all the positive profits from S. Then the final-good producer chooses
the organizational mode so as to maximize its ex-ante profits, which include the
transfer.
Different from Antras (2003, 2005), Antras andHelpman (2004, 2006), we don’t
add the so-called institutional parameter δ in the above setting, which reflects a
country’s quality of institutions.5 Our rationale is that we don’t think it’s appro-
priate for our setting. In their setting, when the contract breaches, the final-good
producer can seize a proportion of the intermediate input produced by S, but the
intermediate-input supplier does not get anything. This implies that the contract
is not fair. Besides, this setting does not tell us that the one breaches the contract
shall be punished.
To find out whether a final-good producer will outsource or integrate the pro-
duction of m at Time 3 , we must compare its payoffs under different organiza-
tional choices, which is shown as follows.
3.1. Integrating in the North
If F only integrates the production in the North, then at Time 3 , its optimal out-
put ofm is the solutionmNV of the problemmaxm π
N
V , from which one gets
mNV = (1− η) (ρzθ
ρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) (fNm )
−
1
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
. (7)
5 In their setting, they assume that if the contract between the two parties breaches, then F
can sell δ part of final product y, and thus its payoff is δρzθρ
(
H
η
)ρη (
m+mO
1−η
)ρ(1−η)
.
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And thus its payoff at Time 3 is
πNV =
1− ρ(1− η)
ρ
(ρzθρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
− fNV . (8)
At Time 2 , the final-good producer’s expected payoff from selecting the pro-
duction capacityH is then
ΠNV =
∫
πNV dz − fhH − fE (9)
=
1− ρ(1− η)
ρ
̟ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) f
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
m
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
− σfNV − fhH − fE ,
where fh =
(
wN
γ
)γ (
rN
1−γ
)1−γ
is the minimal cost producing one unit h in country
N , wN and rN are the prices of labor and capital in the North, respectively, and
̟ =
1− ρ(1 − η)
2− ρ(1 − η)
[(
z¯ +
σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
−
(
z¯ −
σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
]
.
At Time 1 , the final-good producer will choose the following optimal production
capacity of h to maximize its expected payoff
HNV = η̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ
[
f
1−ρ(1−η)
h (f
N
m )
ρ(1−η)
]
−
1
1−ρ
, (10)
and thus its expected payoff at Time 2 is
ΠNV =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(ρθρ)
1
1−ρ ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
[
f ρηh f
ρ−ρη
m
]
−
1
1−ρ − σfNV − fE . (11)
3.2. Outsourcing only in Country l
Now we consider the case that F only outsources its production of m in country
l ∈ {N, S}. In this case, S’s optimal production plan ofm is
mlO = (1− η) [(1− ζ)ρzθ
ρ]
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
1
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
, (12)
then its optimal payoff is
T lO =
[
1
ρ
− (1− η)
]
[(1− ζ)ρθρ]
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
.
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Thus F ’s payoff at Time 3 is
πlO =
[
1
ρ
− (1− ζ)(1− η)
]
(1− ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) (ρzθρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
− f lO.
Then its expected payoff at Time 2 is
Π lO = ̟
[
1
ρ
− (1− ζ)(1− η)
]
(1− ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
(13)
−fhH − σf
l
O − fE .
Therefore, at Time 1 , F will select the following production capacity of h to max-
imize its expected payoff
H lO = κη̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ
[
f
1−ρ(1−η)
h (f
l
m)
ρ(1−η)
]
−
1
1−ρ
, (14)
where
κ =
[
(1− ρ(1− η)(1− ζ))(1− ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
1− ρ(1 − η)
] 1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
.
Substituting (14) into (13) yields
Π lO =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
κ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ − σf lO − fE , l = N, S.(15)
The final-producer choose an optimal bargaining power to maximize its ex-
pected payoff Time 1 . Moreover, combining (11) and (15) and our previous as-
sumption fNV > f
S
O > f
N
O yields
ΠNO −Π
N
V = σ(f
N
V − f
l
O) > 0,
which implies that comparingwith only integration in theNorth,F always prefers
to outsourcing in the North.6
Moreover, there is
ΠSO −Π
N
O =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(ρθρ)
1
1−ρ ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ f
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
]
− σ(fSO − f
N
O ).
6This result depends on the assumption fNV > f
S
O > f
N
O . The result would change had it be
fNV < f
S
O or f
N
V < f
N
O .
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3.3. Integrating in the North and Outsourcing in country l
simultaneously
This subsection consider the case that F simultaneously integrates the produc-
tion ofm in the North and outsource it in country l.
Solving S’s profit maximization problem yields S’s optimal output ofmlO
mlO = (1− η)
{
[(1− ζ)ρzθρ]
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
1
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
−mNV
}
. (16)
Substituting (16) into the first-order condition ofF ’s profitmaximization problem
and rearranging the resulted expression yields
mNV = (1− η) [(1− ζ)ρzθ
ρ]
1
1−ρ(1−η)
[
fNm −
ζ
1− ζ
f lm
]
−
1
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
.
Similarly, we know that F seizes S’s total positive profit from the lump-sum trans-
fer T lO, which can be calculated from substituting m
l
O and m
N
V back into the ex-
pression of S’s payoff. Plugging T lO back into the expression of F ’s payoff yields
πNlV O = χ(1− ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) (ρzθρ)
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
− f lO − f
N
V ,(17)
where
χ =
1
ρ
− (1− η)(1− ζ) +
[
1
ρ
(
(1− ζ)
fNm
f lm
− ζ
)
− (1− η)(1− ζ)
(
fNm
f lm
− 1
)]
×
(
fNm
f lm
−
ζ
1− ζ
)− 1
1−ρ(1−η)
.
We thus get F ’s expected payoff at Time 1 to be
ΠNlV O = χ̟(1− ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) [ρθρ]
1
1−ρ(1−η) (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
(
H
η
) ρη
1−ρ(1−η)
(18)
−σ(f lO + f
N
V )− fhH − fE .
And then the optimal production capacity selected by F at Time 1 should be
HNV = ητ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ
[
f
1−ρ(1−η)
h (f
l
m)
ρ(1−η)
]
−
1
1−ρ
, (19)
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where
τ =
[
ρχ(1 − ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
1− ρ(1− η)
) 1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
.
We then easily to get F ’s maximal expected payoff to be
ΠNlV O =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
τ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ − σ(f lO + f
N
V )− fE .(20)
F will choose an optimal bargainingpower ζ tomaximize its payoffΠ lV O, which
exactly maximizes τ , a function of ζ . We still write its maximal value as τ . Accord-
ing to the appendix, we know that τ > 1 for some ρ < 1.
Now we can compare F ’s payoffs under only outsourcing in country l and un-
der integration in the North and outsourcing in country l. (20) minus (13) yields
ΠNlV O −Π
l
O =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
(τ − 1)̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ (ρθρ)
1
1−ρ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]− 1
1−ρ − σfNV .(21)
3.4. Organizational choices and productivity
It’s easy to see that ΠNV , Π
l
O, Π
Nl
V O are all linear and increasing in Θ = θ
ρ
1−ρ . This
implies that it suffices for us to analyze the relationship between F organizational
choices andΘ to analyze the relationship between F ’s organizational choices and
θ. We thus callΘ the quasi-productivity level of F .
In this subsection, we consider the relationship between F ’s organizational
choices and its productivity level (denoted by Θ) with demand uncertainty level
σ given. There are two cases: τ ≤ 1 and τ > 1. Different values of τ yield different
organizational modes for F .
We first consider the case τ ≤ 1. Let
ΘlO =
σf lO + fE(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ [f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη]
−
1
1−ρ
, l = N, S, (22)
ΘNSO =
σ(fSO − f
N
O )(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ f
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] . (23)
Then there are two potential organizational modes. IfΘSO < Θ
N
O , then forΘ < Θ
S
O,
F ’s net profit is less than 0, and thus the final-good producer will exit the market.
The final-good producer’s net profit will stay in the market and its organizational
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mode is outsourcing in the South for the case Θ > ΘSO. This case is illustrated by
Figure 1.
[ Figure 1 is included here.]
If ΘSO < Θ
N
O , then F ’s net profit is less than 0 for Θ < Θ
S
O, and thus the final-
good producer will exit the market. The final-good producer’s net profit of out-
sourcing in the South is positive and larger than that of outsourcing in the North
for Θ > ΘNSO , and thus its organizational mode is outsourcing in the South. For
ΘSO < Θ < Θ
NS
O , the final-good producer’s net profit of outsourcing in the North
is still positive and larger than that of outsourcing in the South, and thus its or-
ganizational mode is outsourcing in the North. This case is illustrated by Figure
2.
[Figure 2 is included here.]
Note thatΘSO < Θ
N
O if and only if
fNm
fSm
>
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, we thus have the follow-
ing proposition synthesizing the above discussions.
Proposition 1 If ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ ≤ 1, then
1. the final-good producer outsources the production of m in the South if Θ >
ΘSO and exits the market ifΘ < Θ
S
O in the case of
fNm
fSm
≥
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, and
2. the final-good producer outsources the production of m in the South if Θ >
ΘNSO , outsources the production ofm in the North ifΘ
N
O < Θ < Θ
NS
O , and exits
the market ifΘ < ΘNO in the case of
fNm
fSm
<
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
where ΘlO andΘ
NS
O are defined by (22) and (23), respectively.
As
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
is increasing in σ, it’s more possible that the second subcase occurs
if the uncertainty increase under the situation τ ≤ 1 according to Proposition 1.
Moreover, it’s more possible that final-good producers exits the market given the
other parameters in this case.
If τ > 1, then F ’s organizational modes are more than complicated.
Case 1. ΘNO < Θ
S
O.
Let
ΘNlV O =
σ(f lO + f
N
V ) + fE(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ τ̟−
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ [f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη]−
1
1−ρ
, l = N, S.
Then ΘNSV O < Θ
NN
VO if and only if
fNm
fSm
>
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
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We first consider the subcase ΘNSV O < Θ
NN
VO . Let
ΘNSlV OO =
σ(fNV + f
S
O − f
l
O)(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ f
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
(
τ(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
) , l = N, S,(24)
then we have the following possibilities.
If ΘNSV O < Θ
N
O , then F will integrate in the North and outsource in the South
simultaneously the production of m if Θ > ΘNSV O, and it will exit the market if
Θ < ΘNSV O. This case is illustrated in Figure 3 as follows.
[Figure 3 is included here.]
If ΘNO < Θ
NS
V O < Θ
S
O, then F will integrate in the North and outsource in the
South simultaneously the production of m if Θ > ΘNSNVOO , it will exit the market
if Θ < ΘNO , and it will outsource in the North if Θ
N
O < Θ < Θ
NS
V O. This case is
illustrated by Figure 4 as follows.
[Figure 4 is included here.]
If ΘNSV O > Θ
S
O, then F will outsource in the North if Θ
N
O < Θ < Θ
NS
O , it will
outsource in the South if ΘNSO < Θ < Θ
NSS
V OO, it it will integrate in the North and
outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNSSV OO, and it will exit the market if
Θ < ΘNO . The case is illustrated in Figure 5 as follows.
[Figure 5 is included here.]
Summarizing the above discussions, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1. Let
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
<
fNm
fSm
≤
(
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
. Then
1. the final-good producer integrates in the North and outsources in the South
simultaneously the production of m if Θ > ΘNSV O and exits the market if Θ <
ΘNSV O in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
fNm
fSm
≥
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
2. the final-good producer integrates in the North and outsources in the South
simultaneously the production of m if Θ > ΘNSNVOO , outsources in the North
if ΘNO < Θ < Θ
NS
V O and exits the market if Θ < Θ
N
O in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
N
m
fSm
<(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
and τ ≥
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
, and
3. the final-good producer outsources in the North ifΘNO < Θ < Θ
NS
O , outsources
in the South ifΘNSO < Θ < Θ
NSN
VOO , integrate in the North and outsources in the
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South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNSNV OO and exits the market if Θ < Θ
N
O in case of
τ <
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
.
As
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
−
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
=
σ2fNV (f
S
O−f
N
O )
(σfN
O
+fE)(σ(f
N
O
+fN
V
)+fE)
is increasing in σ, the possibili-
ty that the case shown in Proposition 2 increases with the uncertainty σ, in which
the subcase 3 is more possible to occur, the larger σ is, wherein it’s more possible
that the final-good producer exits the market or outsources in the South as ΘNO
and ΘNSNVOO − Θ
NS
O increase with σ.
Now we consider the subcase ΘNSV O > Θ
NN
VO . Define
ΘNNSV O =
σ(fSO − f
N
O )(
1
ρ
− 1
)
τ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ ρ
1
1−ρf
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] , (25)
ΘNNSV OO =
σ(fNO + f
N
V − f
S
O)(
1
ρ
− 1
)
̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ ρ
1
1−ρ f
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
τ(fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] . (26)
then there are the following several possible cases.
If ΘNNVO < Θ
N
O , then F will integrate and outsource in the North simultaneous-
ly the production of m if ΘNNV O < Θ < Θ
NNS
V O , it will integrate in the North and
outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNNSV O and it will exit the market if
Θ < ΘNNVO , where Θ
NNS
V O is the abscissa of the intersection of the lines Π
NS
V O and
ΠNNV O . This case is illustrated by Figure 6 as follows.
[Figure 6 is included here.]
If ΘNO < Θ
NN
VO < Θ
S
O, then F will outsource in the North the production of m
if ΘNO < Θ < Θ
NSN
VOO , it will integrate and outsource in the North simultaneously
if ΘNSNVOO < Θ < Θ
NNS
V O and it will integrate in the North and outsource in the
South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNNSV O , and it will exit the market if Θ < Θ
N
O , where
ΘNNSV O is the abscissa of the intersection of the lines Π
NN
V O and Π
NS
V O , Θ
NNS
V OO is that
of the intersection of the linesΠNNVO andΠ
S
O. This case is illustrated by Figure 7 as
follows.
[Figure 7 is included here.]
If ΘSO < Θ
NN
VO , then F will outsource in the North if Θ
N
O < Θ < Θ
NS
O , it will
outsource in the South if ΘNSO < Θ < Θ
NNS
V OO , it will integrate and outsource in
the North simultaneously if ΘNNSV OO < Θ < Θ
NNS
V O , it will integrate in the North and
outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNNSV O and it will exit the market if
Θ < ΘNO , where Θ
NSN
V OO is the abscissa of the intersection of the linesΠ
N
O andΠ
NS
V O .
This case is illustrated by Figure 8 as follows.
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[Figure 8 is included here.]
Finally, summing up the above discussions yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1. Let f
N
m
fSm
≤
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Then
1. the final-good producer integrates and outsources in the North simultane-
ously the production of m if ΘNNVO < Θ < Θ
NNS
V O , integrates in the North and
outsources in the South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNNSV O and exits the market if
Θ < ΘNNVO in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
fNm
fSm
≥
(
σ(fNO +f
N
V )+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
2. the final-good producer integrates in the North the production of m if ΘNO <
Θ < ΘNSNVOO , integrates and outsources in the North simultaneously if Θ
NSN
VOO <
Θ < ΘNNSV O , integrates in the North and outsources in the South if Θ > Θ
NNS
V O
and exits the market ifΘ < ΘNO in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
N
m
fSm
<
(
σ(fNO +f
N
V )+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
and
τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
S
m
fNm
>
(
σ(fNO +f
N
V )+fE
σfS
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, and
3. the final-good producer outsources in the North the production ofm if ΘNO <
Θ < ΘNSO , outsources in the South if Θ
NS
O < Θ < Θ
NNS
V OO , integrates and out-
sources in the North simultaneously if ΘNNSV OO < Θ < Θ
NNS
V O , integrates in the
North and outsources in the South simultaneously ifΘ > ΘNNSV O and exits the
market if Θ < ΘNO in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
S
m
fNm
≤
(
σ(fNO +f
N
V )+fE
σfS
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
As
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
increases with σ, the possibility that the case shown in Propo-
sition 3 is larger the larger σ is given the other parameters. Moreover, in this case,
the more possible the subcase 3 occurs the larger σ is, wherein the final-good
producer is more possible to exit the market or outsource in the South as ΘNO and
ΘNNSV OO − Θ
NS
O increase with σ.
Case 2. ΘNO > Θ
S
O.
In this case, there are several possible organizational modes different from
the case of ΘNO < Θ
S
O. There are two subcases, Θ
NS
V O < Θ
NN
VO , which is equiva-
lent to f
N
m
fSm
>
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, and ΘNSV O > Θ
NN
VO , which is equivalent to
fNm
fSm
≤(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
. Note that there is always
(
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
>
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
hence ΘNO > Θ
S
O implies that Θ
NS
V O ≥ Θ
NN
VO will never be true, and thus it suffices
for us to consider the former subcase.
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For the former subcase, if ΘNSV O < Θ
S
O, then F will integrate in the North and
outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ < ΘNSV O and it will exit the market if
Θ < ΘNSV O. The case is illustrated in Figure 9 as follows.
[Figure 9 is included here.]
IfΘSO < Θ
NS
V O < Θ
N
O , thenF will outsource in the South ifΘ
S
O < Θ < Θ
NSS
V OO, it will
integrate in the North and outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ > ΘNSSV OO,
and it will exit the market ifΘ < ΘSO. The case is illustrated in Figure 10 as follows.
[Figure 10 is included here.]
Summarizing the above discussion yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1 and f
N
m
fSm
>
(
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Then
1. the final-good producerwill integrate in theNorth andoutsource in the South
simultaneously if Θ < ΘNSV O and it will exit the market if Θ < Θ
NS
V O in the case
of τ >
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
σfS
O
+fE
, and
2. the final-good producer will outsource in the South if ΘSO < Θ < Θ
NSS
V OO, it
will integrate in the North and outsource in the South simultaneously if Θ >
ΘNSSV OO and it will exit the market if Θ < Θ
S
O in the case of τ <
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
and
fNm
fSm
>
(
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
τ(σfN
O
+fE)
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
As
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
increases with σ, the possibility that the case shown in Proposition
4 decreases with σ.
3.5. Organizational choices and uncertainty
Wesee in the above subsection that the demanduncertainty does influence firms’
organizational modes. To investigate it in detail, we need to analyze the relation-
ship between a final-good producer’s organizational choices and the uncertainty
level σ. Let Σ(σ) = ̟
1−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ /σ. According to the discussion of the monotonicity
of Σ(σ) in σ, Σ(σ) is increasing in σ, and hence Σ = Σ(σ) has an inverse func-
tion σ = σ(Σ). This implies that Σ can be used to measure the ”uncertainty” of
demand of F ’s final good.
We still denoteΘ = θ
ρ
1−ρ . To investigateF ’s organizational decisions, it suffices
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for us to compare
Π˜ lO = Π
l
O/σ =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρΘΣ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ − (f lO + fE/σ), l = N, S(27)
with
Π˜NlV O = Π
Nl
V O/σ =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ τΘΣ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ − (f lO + f
N
V + fE/σ),(28)
wherein we ignore the organizational mode of integrating in the North because
it’s dominated by outsourcing in the North.
It’s easy to see that Π˜ lO and Π˜
Nl
V O are increasing in σ. Let Σ
l
O and Σ
Nl
V O be solu-
tions of Π˜ lO = 0 and Π˜
Nl
V O = 0, respectively. Then according to the Appendix, ΘΣ
l
O
andΘΣNlV O are increasing inΘ. Define
ΣNSO =
fSO − f
N
O(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρΘf
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] , (29)
ΣNSlV OO =
fNV + f
S
O − f
l
O(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρΘf
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
τ(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (f lm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] , l = N, S,
ΣNNSV O =
fSO − f
N
O(
1
ρ
− 1
)
τρ
1
1−ρΘf
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
(fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] ,
ΣNNSV OO =
fNO + f
N
V − f
S
O(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρΘf
−
ρη
1−ρ
h
[
τ(fNm )
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ − (fSm)
−
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ
] .
Obviously, they are all independent from Σ. It suffices for us to compare Π˜ lO −
fE/σ and Π˜
Nl
V O − fE/σ insteading of comparing Π˜
l
O and Π˜
l
V O for l = N, S. We con-
clude immediately that the four propositions formulated in the former subsec-
tions holds for the relationships between organizational modes and uncertainty
Σ, with those parameters of Θ replaced by those of Σ, shown above. Without
proofs, we list them as follows. The shortcoming of these propositions is that
their conditions are related to Σ itself. As a special case with fE = 0, the demand
uncertainty results in the same effects on a final-good producer’s organizational
choices.
Proposition 5 If ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ ≤ 1, then
1. the final-good producer outsources the production of m in the South if Σ >
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ΣSO and exits the market ifΣ < Σ
S
O in the case of
fNm
fSm
≥
(
σfS
O
+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, and
2. the final-good producer outsources the production of m in the South if Σ >
ΣNSO , outsources the production ofm in the North ifΣ
N
O < Σ < Σ
NS
O and exits
the market ifΣ < ΣNO in the case of
fNm
fSm
<
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Proposition 6 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1. Let
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
<
fNm
fSm
≤
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
. Then
1. the final-good producer integrates in the North and outsources in the South
simultaneously the production of m if Σ > ΣNSV O and exits the market if Σ <
ΣNSV O in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
N
m
fSm
≥
(
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
2. the final-good producer integrates in the North and outsources in the South
simultaneously the production of m if Σ > ΣNSNV OO , outsources in the North
if ΣNO < Σ < Σ
NS
V O and exits the market if Σ < Σ
N
O in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
N
m
fSm
<(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
and τ ≥
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
, and
3. the final-good producer outsources in the North if ΣNO < Σ < Σ
NS
O , out-
sources in the South if ΣNSO < Σ < Σ
NSN
V OO , integrate in the North and out-
sources in the South simultaneously if Σ > ΣNSNV OO and exits the market if
Σ < ΣNO in case of τ <
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1. Let f
N
m
fSm
≤
(
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Then
1. the final-good producer integrates and outsources in the North simultane-
ously the production of m if ΣNNV O < Σ < Σ
NNS
V O , integrates in the North and
outsources in the South simultaneously if Σ > ΣNNSV O and exits the market if
Σ < ΣNNV O in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
N
m
fSm
≥
(
σ(fNO +f
N
V )+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
,
2. the final-good producer outsources in the North the production ofm if ΣNO <
Σ < ΣNSNV OO , integrates and outsources in the North simultaneously ifΣ
NSN
V OO <
Σ < ΣNNSV O , integrates in the North and outsources in the South if Σ > Σ
NNS
V O
and exits the market ifΣ < ΣNO in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
fNm
fSm
<
(
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
and
τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
fSm
fNm
>
(
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
, and
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3. the final-good producer outsources in the North the production ofm ifΣNO <
Σ < ΣNSO , outsources in the South if Σ
NS
O < Σ < Σ
NNS
V OO , integrates and out-
sources in the North simultaneously if ΣNNSV OO < Σ < Σ
NNS
V O , integrates in the
North and outsources in the South simultaneously ifΣ > ΣNNSV O and exits the
market ifΣ < ΣNO in case of τ
1−ρ
ρ(1−η) f
S
m
fNm
≤
(
σ(fN
O
+fN
V
)+fE
σfS
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Proposition 8 Suppose that ρ, η and f
N
m
fSm
are such that τ > 1 and f
N
m
fSm
>
(
σfSO+fE
σfN
O
+fE
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
Then
1. the final-good producerwill integrate in theNorth andoutsource in the South
simultaneously ifΣ > ΣNSV O and it will exit the market ifΣ < Σ
NS
V O in the case
of τ >
σ(fSO+f
N
V )+fE
σfS
O
+fE
, and
2. the final-good producer will outsource in the South if ΣSO < Σ < Σ
NSS
V OO, it
will integrate in the North and outsource in the South simultaneously ifΣ >
ΣNSSV OO and it will exit the market if Σ < Σ
S
O in case of τ <
σ(fS
O
+f
)
V
+fE
σfS
O
+fE
and
fNm
fSm
>
(
σ(fS
O
+fN
V
)+fE
τ(σfN
O
+fE)
) 1−ρ
ρ(1−η)
.
In summary, demand uncertainty level owns the same effect to a firm’s organi-
zational choices as that of its productivity level. This result is a little astonishing,
but interesting. However, productivity takes effects for individual firms, while the
demand uncertainty does for all firms.
4. Prevalence of organizational modes
It’s interesting to investigate how demand uncertainty (productivity) affects the
prevalence of various organizational modes with productivity (demand uncer-
tainty) of a final-good producer being fixed. According to Antras and Helpman
(2004), the prevalence of an organizational mode is its occurrence probability.
Suppose u, v, w are three two-two adjoint organizational modes occurring in a
firm’s series of organizational modes, and the productivity cutoff from u to v is
θuv, and that from v to w is θvw, where θuv < θvw. Then the prevalence of organi-
zational mode v is Pr(v) = G(θvw) − G(θuv). As G(θ) is increasing in θ, it suffices
for us to investigate how the ratio θvw
θuv
of θvw and θuv varies with the demand un-
certainty σ. If θuv is decreasing in σ, while
θvw
θuv
is decreasing in σ, then we conclude
immediately that the prevalence of v is decreasing in σ.
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Note that
dΘlO
dσ
< 0,
dΘNSO
dσ
< 0,
dΘNlV O
dσ
< 0,
dΘNSlV OO
dσ
< 0,
dΘNNSVO
dσ
< 0,
dΘNNSVOO
dσ
< 0
according to the increasing monotonicity of Σ(σ) in σ. It’s also easy to see that
d(ΘlO/Θ
NS
O )
dσ
< 0,
d(ΘNlV O/Θ
NSl
V OO)
dσ
< 0. From these two facts and what asserted in Propo-
sition 1 to Proposition 4, we conclude immediately the following result.
If a firm’s demand uncertainty σ is fixed, then we have immediately the follow-
ing proposition according to (29).
Proposition 9 If a final-good producer’s productivity is fixed, then with the in-
crease of demand uncertainty, the prevalence of the organizational mode of
1. exiting the market decreases,
2. outsourcing in the North decreases,
3. outsourcing in the South increases,
4. integrating and outsourcing in the North simultaneously decreases,
5. and integrating in the North and outsourcing in the South simultaneously
increases
if it occurs in the firm’s organizational modes.
Interestingly, though demanduncertainty andproductivity of a final-goodpro-
ducer affects its organizational choices in a very uniform way, they have asym-
metric influences on the prevalence of various organizational modes. In fact, ap-
plying the approach that we derive Proposition 9 and by the increasing Mono-
tonicity of ΘΣlO(Θ) and ΘΣ
Nl
V O(Θ), we conclude the following result.
Proposition 10 If a final-good producer’s uncertainty is fixed, then with the in-
crease of productivity, the prevalence of the organizational mode of
1. exiting the market decreases,
2. outsourcing in the North decreases,
3. integrating and outsourcing in the North simultaneously decreases,
4. integrating in the North and outsourcing in the South simultaneously in-
creases,
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if it occurs in the firm’s organizationalmodes. But the prevalence of outsourcing in
the South does not necessarily decreases. If it occurs when the firm does not choose
the mode of integrating in the North and outsourcing in the South simultaneously,
its prevalence increases with the increase of the productivity, otherwise, the situa-
tion is reversed.
5. General equilibrium
In this section, we show how a general equilibrium is determined and howwe can
find it.
Let Π(θ) = maxl=N,S{Π
l
O, Π
Nl
V O}. Then Π(θ) is a function of θ given σ, ρ and
η. Let H(θ), mNV (θ) and m
l
O(θ) be respectively F ’ production capacity of h deter-
mined at Time 1 , its output ofm produced in the North at Time 3 , and S’s output
of m produced in country l at Time 3 , which maximize Π(θ), given F ’s produc-
tivity level θ in an industry (if F does not outsource in country l, thenmlO(θ) = 0;
if F does not integrate in the North, thenmNV (θ) = 0). Then F ’s output of its final
good is y(θ) = θ
(
H
η
)η (
mNV +m
S
O+m
N
O
1−η
)1−η
. Let the output of the homogeneous good
in country l be yl0. Herem
N
V , m
l
O andH are all correlated with fh and f
l
m. Then the
labor and the capital demanded for producing yl0 units of homogeneous good in
country l are
∂f l0
∂wl
yl0 and
∂f l0
∂rl
yl0, respectively, where f
l
0 =
(
wl
α
)α ( rl
1−α
)1−αl . Similarly,
for each final-good producer with productivity level θ, the labor and capital de-
manded in the North to produce H(θ) units of h are ∂fh
∂wN
H and ∂fh
∂rN
H , and those
demanded in the North under integration to producemNV (θ) units ofm are
∂fNm
∂wN
mNV
and ∂fh
∂rN
mNV , respectively. For its supplier, those demanded to producem
l
O(θ) units
ofm under outsourcing in country l are respectively ∂f
l
m
∂wl
mlO and
∂f lm
∂rl
mlO. Then for
each differentiated good, the expected labor and the expected capital demanded
to produce it in countryN are respectively
∫ [
∂fh
∂wN
H(θ) +
∂fNm
∂wN
mNV (θ) +
∂fNm
∂wN
mNO (θ)
]
dG(θ)
and
∫ [
∂fh
∂rN
H(θ) +
∂fNm
∂rN
mNV (θ) +
∂fNm
∂rN
mNO (θ)
]
dG(θ),
whereG(•) is the cumulative distribution of θ.
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Those demanded to produce its intermediated-input in country S are respec-
tively
∫ ∂fSm
∂wS
mSO(θ)dG(θ) and
∫ ∂fSm
∂rS
mSO(θ)dG(θ). Then the clearing conditions for
the factor markets in countryN are
∫ [
∂fN0
∂wN
yN0 + n
∫ [
∂fh
∂wN
H(θ) +
∂fNm
∂wN
mNV (θ) +
∂fNm
∂wN
mNO (θ)
]
dG(θ)
]
f(z)dz = LN ,(30)∫ [
∂fN0
∂rN
yN0 + n
∫ [
∂fh
∂rN
H(θ) +
∂fNm
∂rN
mNV (θ) +
∂fNm
∂rN
mNO (θ)
]
dG(θ)
]
f(z)dz = KN ,(31)
where f(z) is the density function of z. Those for the factor markets in country S
are
∫ [
∂fS0
∂wS
yS0 + n
∫
∂fSm
∂wS
mSO(θ)dG(θ)
]
f(z)dz = LS , (32)∫ [
∂fS0
∂rS
yS0 + n
∫
∂fSm
∂rS
mSO(θ)dG(θ)
]
f(z)dz = KS, (33)
where n is the number of differentiated goods in the North, which can be found
by solving the following zero-profit condition for each final-good producer
∫ [
(1−G(θ))
∫ +∞
θ
Π(θ)dG(θ)
]
f(z)dz = δFE , (34)
where δ is the probability that a firm survives to the next period, which is assumed
to be constant over all the periods, and θ is the productivity cutoff, below which
the firmwill exit themarket. Here, their prices (and quantities produced) at equi-
librium are the same (denoted by p) according to symmetry of differentiated final
goods. Solving (30)-(34) yields the equilibrium variables.
Note that it’s difficult to solve Equations (30)-(34) because any final-good pro-
ducer’s organizational modes in themarkets are influenced by f
N
m
fSm
, while the latter
can only be determined after the organizational modes have been determined.
To solve the above equations and finally determine the equilibrium prevalence of
various organizational modes in the markets, we shall apply numerically compu-
tational methods, which deserves another paper to investigate the sophistication
under various factor endowments for the two countries. We neglect it here.
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6. Conclusion
Though there are many literatures having investigated the relationship between
intergration, outsourcing and uncertainty, this paper proposes a new framework
to investigate firm’s organizational decisions of ownership and location with het-
erogeneous firms under uncertainty. The key point in our model is that Demand
uncertainty occurs after the unexpandableproduction capacity of h is determined.
However, this may cause profit losses for the final-good producer. Thefeore, it
causes the final-good producer to adjust its organizational decisions so as to mit-
igate it. We show that demand uncertainty results in partial outsourcing, i.e., a
final-good producermay integrate part of the production ofm and outsource part
of it domestically or abroad, which depends on the producer’s productivity level,
the uncertainty degree of demand, the ratio between the variable costs produc-
ingm in the North and in the South, the organizational costs, the entry costs, etc.
Summing up, with other parameters given, a final-good producer never chooses
only integrating the production ofm in the North, and its organizational choices
are outsourcing in the North, outsourcing in the South, integrating and outsourc-
ing simultaneously in the North, and integrating in the North and outsourcing
in the South simultaneously, in turn with increasing of its productivity level θ. A
final-good producer does not only choose integration or outsourcing of the pro-
duction of m. These new organizational modes never occur in other literatures
with heterogenous productivity, incomplete contracts, fixed entry and organiza-
tional costs, without incorporating uncertainty and production capacity. such as
Antras and Helpman (2004), Antras and Helpman (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2007),
etc. For the relationship among organizational modes and uncertainty, we also
show that the increase of the uncertainty of a final-good producer’s demand re-
sults in turn in outsourcing in the North, outsourcing in the South, integrating
and outsourcing simultaneously in the North, and integrating in the North and
outsourcing in the South simultaneously.
The framework proposed in this paper can be extended inmultiple direction-
s. First, it can be extended to the case that the organizational choices are made
before the demand uncertainty is realized. In this case, the investment in the
intermediated input m shall be made before the demand uncertainty and it can
not be expanded afterward. We are sure that the order a final-good producer gets
aware of its demand may influence its organizational choices. Second, one may
consider the case that a final-good producer can simultaneously outsource the
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production ofm in both countries. This consideration yieldsmore organizational
modes and thus the situation is more complicated. Moreover, as suppliers’ in-
vestment in the production of m in the two countries may influence that of the
opposite, so that their strategic interaction finally affects their bargaining pow-
ers toward the final-good producer. Hence, to analyze this situation, one has to
model bargaining process among multiple parties, which is our main research
work in the future. Finally, one can further investigate how factor endowments
of countries influence the trade patterns under the setting of demand uncertain-
ty, investment irreversibility and unexpandability and firms’ choices of various
organizational modes.
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Appendix
Themaximal value of τ(ζ)
To see whether the optimal value of τ(ζ) is possible to be larger than 1, it suf-
fices to find the maximal value of the function g(ζ) = χ(1 − ζ)
ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) . To simplify
deduction, we take the following transformation:
x =
ζ
1− ζ
,
then
ζ =
x
1 + x
, 1− ζ =
1
1 + x
.
Let
a = −
1
ρ
, c =
fNm
f lm
, b =
(
1
ρ
− (1− η)
)
c + 1− η, d = −
1
1 − ρ(1 − η)
,
then
g(x) =
[
−a(1 + x)− (1− η) + (ax+ b)(c− x)d
]
(1 + x)d.
The first-order condition of the maximization problem of g(x) reduces to
d(ax+ b)(c− x)d−1(c− 1− 2x) + a(1 + x)(c− x)d − a(1 + d)(1 + x) = d(1− η).
The above equation has no analytic solutions. So we can not analytically know
whether g(x)’s maximal value is larger than 1 or not. To see, we need to on-
ly consider the case of x = − b
a
= ρ(1 − η) + [1 − ρ(1 − η)]f
N
m
f lm
. Then c − x =[
fNm
f lm
− 1
]
ρ(1− η), 1 + x = 1 + ρ(1 − η) + [1− ρ(1− η)]f
N
m
f lm
. Thus
g
(
b
a
)
=
1
ρ
1 + (1− ρ(1− η))f
N
m
f lm[
1 + (1− ρ(1− η))f
N
m
f lm
+ ρ(1− η)
] 1
1−ρ(1−η)
.
It’s easy to see that limρ→0 g
(
b
a
)
= +∞ for given η ∈ (0, 1). Hence there exists
indeed ρ (for example, sufficiently small ρ, according to the continuity of g
(
b
a
)
with respect to (ρ, η)), such that g
(
b
a
)
> 1. This implies that the maximal value of
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g(x) hence the optimal value of τ(ζ) is larger than 1 for some ρ < 1.
Themonotonicity ofΣ(σ) in σ
To explore the monotonicity of Σ(σ) in σ, it suffices for us to investigate that of
the function
h(σ) =
1− ρ(1− η)
1− ρ
ln
[(
z¯ +
σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
−
(
z¯ −
σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
]
− ln σ. (35)
It’s easy to get the derivative of hwith respect to σ to be
h′(σ) =
2− ρ(1 − η)
2(1− ρ)
(
z¯ + σ
2
) 1
1−ρ(1−η) +
(
z¯ − σ
2
) 1
1−ρ(1−η)(
z¯ + σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η) −
(
z¯ − σ
2
) 2−ρ(1−η)
1−ρ(1−η)
−
1
σ
.
Let a = 1
1−ρ(1−η)
, b = 2−ρ(1−η)
2(1−ρ)
, x =
z¯−σ
2
z¯+σ
2
, then x ∈ (0, 1), and a > 1, b > 1. Under
these notations, we can rewrite h′(σ) as
h′(σ) =
1
z¯ + σ
2
(
b(1 + xa)
1− xa+1
−
1
1− x
)
.
To judge the sign of h′(σ), it suffices for us to judge the sign of
t(x) =
b(1 + xa)
1− xa+1
−
1
1− x
.
Note that
t′(x) =
abxa−1 + (a+ 1)bxa + bx2a
(1− xa+1)2
+
1
(1− x)2
> 0,
which implies that t(x) is increasing in x. As t(0) = b − 1 > 0, we conclude that
t(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). This implies that h′(σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ (0, 2z¯). HenceΣ(σ)
is increasing in σ for all σ ∈ (0, 2z¯).
IncreasingMonotonicity ofΘΣ lO(Θ) andΘΣ
Nl
V O(Θ)
To see the increasing Monotonicity of ΘΣlO(Θ) and ΘΣ
Nl
V O(Θ), it suffices for us
to consider the monotonicity of g(Θ) = ΘΣ(Θ), where Θ is the solution of the
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Figure 1: F only outsources in the South
following equation
aΘΣ −
fE
σ
− b = 0, (36)
where a, b > 0.
First, asΣ is increasing in σ, we have dΣ
dΘ
< 0 and dσ
dΘ
> 0 according to Equation
(36). Second, we have h(Θ) = 1
a
(
b+ fE
σ(Θ)
)
. And thus
dh
dΘ
= −
fE
a
1
σ2
dσ
dΘ
> 0,
which implies that h is increasing inΘ.
Specifying a =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ b = f lO for ΘΣ
l
O, and specifying
a = ΠNlV O/σ =
(
1
ρ
− 1
)
ρ
1
1−ρ τΘΣ
[
f ρηh (f
l
m)
ρ−ρη
]
−
1
1−ρ and b = f lO + f
N
V for ΘΣ
Nl
V O, we
conclude their increasing monotonicity.
Figures
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Figure 2: F outsources in the North first, and then outsources in the South
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Figure 3: F integrates in the North and outsources in the South simultaneously
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Figure 4: F outsources in the North first, and then integrates in the North and
outsources in the South simultaneously
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Figure 5: F outsources in the North first, and then outsources in the South, then
integrates in the North and outsources in the South simultaneously
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Figure 6: F integrates and outsources in the North simultaneously first, and then
integrates in the North and outsources in the South simultaneously
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Figure 7: F outsources in the North first, and then integrates and outsources in
the North simultaneously, and then integrates in the North and outsources in the
South simultaneously
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Figure 8: F outsources in the North first, and then outsources in the South, then
integrates and outsources in the North simultaneously, then integrates in the
North and outsources in the South simultaneously
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Figure 9: F only integrates in the North and outsources in the South simultane-
ously
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Figure 10: F outsources in the South first, and then integrates in the North and
outsources in the South simultaneously
